Representation Under the Ohio Public Defender Act by Conkle, Daniel O.
Note
Representation Under the Ohio
Public Defender Act
If we are to keep our democracy,
there must be one commandment:
Thou shalt not ration justice.!
I. INTRODUCTION
The last forty-five years have witnessed such an expansion in the
constitutional right to publicly provided legal counsel2 that a corollary
to the above-quoted commandment might be suggested: To avoid a
rationing of justice, thou shalt develop an efficient system for providing
legal counsel for those unable to retain their own. The Ohio Public
Defender Act, enacted in 1975, a could be viewed as at least a partial
response to such a corollary commandment. The Act, which enacted
chapter 120 of the Ohio Revised Code4 and amended or repealed
numerous Revised Code sections, created the Ohio Public Defender
Commission and authorized publicly provided representation ser-
vices at both the state and local levels under the ultimate supervision
of the Commission.6
Perhaps the most significant issues under the Act relate to its pro-
visions for legal representation at the state or local level . The Act's
general representation scheme is an appropriate response to state and
local interests in maintaining and controlling a system of publicly pro-
vided representation. The Act, however, is plagued with problems of
interpretation. In some cases, the Act authorizes representation well
beyond that required by constitutional dictates. Other representation
provisions, however, fall short of what the Constitution has been held
to require. Furthermore, many of the particular representation pro-
visions are seemingly devoid of comprehensible meaning. Such statu-
tory confusion necessarily hinders the implementation of an effective
1. Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 293-94 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting
Judge Learned Hand, address before Legal Aid Society of New York (Feb. 16, 1951)).
2. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
3. Am. Sub. H.B. No. 164, 136 Ohio Laws 1868 (1975).
4. Orno REV. CODE ANN. §§ 120.01-.40 (Page 1978).
5. Id. § 120.01.
6. Id. §§ 120.06, .16, .26, .33.
7. Another significant issue is the effect of the Act on state reimbursement of county-
paid counsel services and court costs. See, e.g., id. §§ 120.18, .28, .33(D); 2949.19-.20; 2301.24-.25;
2941.51 (Page 1978 & Supp. 1977).
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program of representation and leaves public defenders, private attor-
neys, the judiciary, and potential clients in doubt concerning the
proper role for the various public defender offices and for assigned pri-
vate counsel.
This Note will first set forth the constitutional backdrop against
which the Ohio Act was passed. It will then discuss the mandatory
and permissive representation provisions for the state public defender
and for local public defenders respectively and the relationship be-
tween public defender representation at each level. Representation
under a county-level option for the use of an assigned private counsel
system will also be described. Finally, the Act's provisions relating
to indigency as an eligibility requirement for clients will be discussed.
Within this framework, the Note will analyze the Act in terms of the
types of cases in which representation is authorized, the stages of the
proceedings at which representation is to begin and continue, and the
types of clients eligible for legal services under the Act. This Note
will evaluate the Act's general scheme for providing legal services,
its constitutional sufficiency, and its statutory clarity or lack thereof.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES LEADING TO THE ENACTMENT:
THE RIGHT TO PUBLICLY PROVIDED LEGAL COUNSEL
In order to properly analyze and evaluate the Ohio Public De-
fender Act's provisions for legal representation in Ohio, it is first
necessary to delineate the nature and extent of the constitutional right
to publicly provided counsel to which the Act responds!
A. In What Types of Cases Does the Right Exist?
Upon reading the sixth amendment, one would conclude that a
right to counsel exists in any and all "criminal prosecutions," and not
in other types of proceedings. 9 The right, however, has been inter-
preted to be both narrower and broader than the sixth amendment's
literal command. Prior to Gideon v. Wainwright,10 the sixth amend-
ment was not directly applicable to state criminal prosecutions at all,"
and even today one may be denied counsel in certain state criminal
prosecutions. 12  On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court
has extended the right to counsel to quasi-criminal juvenile proceed-
8. See generally Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel: Aigersinger and Icyond, 12
Am. CRIM. L. REV. 601 (1975); Note, Of Trumpeters, Pipers, and Swingmen: What Tue Is
the Burger Court Playing in Right to Representation Cases?, 29 VAND. L. REV. 776 (1976),
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." The Ohio Constitution also
provides for assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions. Ollo CONST. art. 1, § 10.
10. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
I1. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
12. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972).
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ings,13 and the Supreme Court of Ohio has specifically recognized a
federal constitutional right to counsel in involuntary civil commitment
proceedings.
1 4
As to criminal prosecutions, the United States Supreme Court in
Powell v. Alabama 5 first recognized the right to counsel in a 15rosecu-
tion for a capital offense. The Court later extended the right to all
federal criminal prosecutions16 and-twenty-five years later-to state fel-
ony prosecutions.1 7  Finally, in Argersinger v. Hamlin,18 the Court
held that no person could be imprisoned for a criminal offense, even
a misdemeanor, unless he had had the opportunity for assistance of
counsel.
The precise contours of the Argersinger decision have been sub-
ject to debate. Most courts have held that there is no violation of
one's right to counsel in misdemeanor cases unless imprisonment is
actually ordered, regardless of the potential penalty.19 Other courts
have indicated that the right to counsel not only precludes imprison-
ment in the absence of counsel, but also extends a positive right to
counsel in the case of any "serious" offense for which a significant
maximum imprisonment is authorized by statute, even if the judge
specifically indicates before trial that he will not in fact impose an in-
carceration penalty.20 One noted jurist has expressed the broadest view
of Argersinger: that the case "extended the right to counsel to every
offense that could possibly result in imprisonment, even for 1 day."2'
The right to counsel has also been recognized in proceedings that
have traditionally been viewed as civil.22  In In re Gault, 23 the United
13. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In cases other than criminal prosecutions, the right
is not founded on the sixth amendment, but instead is based on the due process clause of either
the fifth or the fourteenth amendment. See id. at 41.
14. In re Fisher, 39 Ohio St. 2d 71, 313 N.E.2d 851 (1974).
15. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
16. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
17. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Even before Gideon, the Supreme Court
had recognized a right to counsel in certain noncapital state felony prosecutions. %hen excep-
tional circumstances were thought to demand the presence of defense counsel. See, e.g.,
Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962).
18. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
19. Eg., Sweeten v. Sneddon, 463 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1972); Mahler v. Birnbaum. 95
Idaho 14, 501 P.2d 282 (1972). See also L. HERMAN, TIlE RIGHr TO CouNsEL. IN MSDEMEVAOR
COURT 74 (1973).
20. Eg., Wood v. Superintendent Caroline Correctional Unit, 355 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.
Va. 1973). See also Mills v. Municipal Court, 10 CaL 3d 288, 515 P.2d 273. 110 Cal. Rptr.
329 (1973). For a vehement argument that this represents the proper view. see Duke, supra
note 8, at 604-09.
21. Clark, Gideon Revisited, 15 ARIz. L. REv. 343, 352 (1973). It has been suggested
that the Supreme Court might extend the right to counsel to cases having no potential for im-
prisonment at all, but having possible penalties including a loss of privilege or significant op-
probrium. Note, supra note 8, at 792-93.
22. See generally Rossman, 77e Scope of the Sixth Amendment: 117:o is a Criminal Dc-
fendant?, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 633 (1975).
23. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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States Supreme Court guaranteed assistance of counsel to juveniles in
juvenile court proceedings that could result in incarceration. Although
the Court in Gault did not specifically extend the right to counsel to
parents in juvenile proceedings that could remove their child from
them, there are indications that this right may exist. 24  Furthermore,
it has been suggested that the Supreme Court would25 or should26 ex-
tend the right to counsel to those threatened with civil commitments.
The Supreme Court of Ohio, in In re Fisher,27 has expressly recog-
nized a federal right to counsel in mental commitment proceedings-
civil proceedings to determine whether a person should be involun-
tarily committed to a mental institution. For proceedings to adjudi-
cate alleged incompetency, but not to result in commitment, no con-
stitutional right to counsel has been recognized, although many states
provide a statutory right in these circumstances. 28
B. At What Stages in the Proceedings?
Especially in criminal cases, the recognition of a right to counsel
at trial does not put to rest the issue of legal representation. Rather,
it must also be determined when the right to counsel first attaches
before trial and when the right exists after the trial stage has passed.
In United States v. Wade,29 the United States Supreme Court stated
that an accused has a right to counsel at "critical" stages in the prose-
cution "where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's
right to a fair trial., 30  Specific pre-trial situations in which the right
to counsel exists include lineups after indictment 31 and custodial in-
terrogations.32 However, no general right to counsel exists, except in
custodial interrogations, before "the initiation of adversary judicial
criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." 33  Moreover, even
after adversary judicial proceedings have commenced, the right to
counsel only attaches when a "trial-like confrontation" is present.34
24. See Arizona State Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Barlow, 80 Ariz. 249, 296 P.2d 298 (1956).
25. Note, supra note 8, at 803-04.
26. Note, Civil Commitments: Should There be a Constitutional Right to Counsel, 2
CAP. U.L. Rev. 126 (1973).
27. 39 Ohio St. 2d 71, 313 N.E.2d 851 (1974). The court later refused to extend Fisher to
civil contempt proceedings. In re Calhoun, 47 Ohio St. 2d 15, 350 N.3.2d 665 (1976).
28. See Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 950 (1963). Given the far-reaching consequences of an ad-
judication of incompetency, a right to counsel seems quite appropriate. See generally Dewey,
Civil Incompetency in Ohio: Determination and Effect, 34 U. CIN. L. REv. 419 (1965).
29. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
30. Id. at 226.
31. Id.
32. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
33. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). See also United States v. Mandujano,
425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976).
34. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 314 (1973).
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If the accused does not prevail at trial, he has an absolute right
to counsel in an appeal as of right, 5 but not in a discretionary appeal. 6
It is as yet unclear whether the Constitution requires counsel in
postconviction proceedings commenced after the exhaustion of ap-
peals.37 Ohio, however, has required counsel in these proceedings by
statute.38  Finally, the United States Supreme Court has stated that a
right to counsel may exist at probation and parole-revocation hear-
ings, depending on the need for counsel in each individual case, but
has refused to recognize an absolute right to counsel at these hear-
ings.
39
C. For What Types of Clients?
It has never been seriously suggested that a right to publicly pro-
vided counsel extends to those who are readily able to procure pri-
vate counsel. In Powell v. Alabama,40 the first Supreme Court case to
recognize a right to publicly provided counsel, the Court spoke of de-
fendants "unable to employ counsel." 42 In later cases, the Court re-
ferred to defendants who were "poor"  and "too poor to hire a law-
yer. ,4
3
More troublesome than finding agreement on the general proposi-
tion that only those unable to obtain private counsel are entitled to
publicly provided counsel is attempting to draw a line between those
who are so entitled and those who are not. Courts have generally
focused on indigency as the standard of eligibility but have had diffi-• 44
culty in more specifically defining this standard. The United States
Supreme Court has provided little direct guidance in solving this prob-
lem.45 In a little-noticed footnote in his concurring opinion in Hardy
v. United States,4  Mr. Justice Goldberg did suggest a thoughtful
35. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
36. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
37. See Steele, The Doctrine of Right to Counsel: Its Impact on the Administration of
Criminal Justice and the Legal Profession, 23 Sw. L.J. 488, 500-01 (1969).
38. Onlo R-v. CODE ANN. § 2953.24 (Page 1975). This section was repealed by the Ohio
Public Defender Act, but the right to counsel in asserting a claim for posteonviction relief is
retained under the Act. Id. § 120.06(A)(4) (Page 1978).
39. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973). Cf. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128
(1967) (recognizing right to counsel in post-trial proceeding for revocation of probation and im-
position of deferred sentence in the case of a felony defendant).
40. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
41. Id. at 71.
42. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
43. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
44. Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 1108 (1973).
45. Mr. Justice Douglas suggested a need to examine liabilities as well as assets in his
dissent in United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239, 244-45 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Mr.
Justice Powell merely referred to the problem in his concurring opinion in Argersinger v. Ham-
lin, 407 U.S. 25, 50 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
46. 375 U.S. 277, 289 n.7 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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general test for determining indigency. He stated that an accused
should be deemed indigent when his lack of means "substantially in-
hibits or prevents the proper assertion" of his right or claim, and that
a person can be indigent without being "totally devoid of means."
' 7
Courts throughout the United States, at both the federal and state
levels, have generally formulated broad criteria for determining
whether an accused is sufficiently needy to be entitled to publicly pro-
vided counsel. They typically examine the accused's entire financial
situation, including his assets, liabilities, income, and expenses, to de-
termine whether he lacks the financial means to retain an attorney.4
In addition, most courts have refused to consider the financial re-
sources of relatives and friends of the accused, limiting the inquiry to
the accused himself.
49
The Supreme Court of Ohio dealt with the problem of eligibility
for publicly provided counsel in State v. Tymcio.50 The court held
that the right "depends, not upon whether the accused ought to be
able to employ counsel, but whether he is in fact 'unable to employ
counsel.' "" Although the reason for an inability to obtain counsel is
usually insufficient financial means, that is not the only possible reason.
A potential client may have such a notorious criminal reputation or
unpopular political beliefs that members of the private bar simply re-
fuse to provide legal services, even though compensation would en-
sue.5 2  Tymcio is significant for its extension of the obligation to pro-
vide counsel to persons other than the indigent: "When an accused
is financially able, in whole or in part, to obtain the assistance of
counsel, but is unable to do so for whatever reason, appointed coun-
sel must be provided. In such case, appropriate arrangements may
subsequently be made to recompense appointed counsel for legal ser-
vices rendered. 53  The Tymcio court did not specifically deal with
criteria for determining eligibility in the typical case of a claimed fi-
nancial need. Nonetheless, the court's expansive approach to "in-
ability to obtain counsel" suggests that the Ohio Supreme Court would
use a liberal test in determining whether financial inability is present.
47. Id.
48. Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 1108, 1111-14 (1973); see, e.g., In re Smiley, 66 Cal, 2d 606, 427
P.2d 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1967). Cf. Duke, supra note 8, at 628 (suggesting a liberal approach
for defining indigency, based on whether the cost of a defense would impose a substantial hard-
ship on the accused or his family). See also Comment, 77e Definition of Indigenev: A Modern
Day Legal Jabberwockyl 4 ST. MARY'S L.J. 34 (1972).
49. Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 1108, 1114-16 (1973).
50. 42 Ohio St. 2d 39, 325 N.E.2d 556 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 993 (1975).
51. Id. at 39, 325 N.E.2d at 557.
52. This is true despite an ethical consideration to the contrary in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-27 (1976).
53. 42 Ohio St. 2d at 45, 325 N.E.2d at 561 (emphasis added).
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III. REPRESENTATION UNDER THE OHIO ACT
As the constitutional right to counsel was increasingly expanded,
Ohio's method for providing the mandated legal services became in-
creasingly inadequate. Under Ohio law prior to 1975, 54 the state had
no uniform system of public defender representation. Although larger
municipalities had public defender offices, much of the state used ap-
pointed counsel to represent indigents.5s The state reimbursed coun-
ties for the cost of counsel fees and expenses only in felony cases
that resulted in conviction. 6 These prerequisites to reimbursement
risked prejudicing the rights of indigent defendants. County prosecu-
tors desiring state reimbursement for their counties might have felt pres-
sured to charge indigents with felonies rather than misdemeanors.
For similar reasons, local judges might have been induced to make
findings and give instructions more likely to result in conviction when
an indigent was the accused. Thus, these provisions were of question-
able constitutional validity.5 7  In any case, a system generally relying
on the appointment of private attorneys to fill an ever-increasing need
for legal services was outmoded and inefficient.
By the time the Ohio Legislature acted in 1975, enacting the
Ohio Public Defender Act, a number of states had already responded
to the constitutional pressures for publicly provided counsel with compre-
hensive legislation providing for public defender representation. 5
In many of these states, a state-level public defender or agency simply
provides statewide legal services.59 Other states allow more local
control by having county or district-level defenders in addition to a
state defender or agency. 60 At least one state, Florida, retains local
autonomy in a most direct way; the state has no state-level program at
all, and its local defenders are publicly elected officials. 6'
54. See OHIO CRIM. R. 44 (Page 1975); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2941.50-.51, 2949.15, .19
(Page 1975). Section 2941.50, relating to the appointment of assigned counsel, was repealed by
the Ohio Public Defender Act. The Act amended § 2941.51, relating to the payment of as-
signed counsel. Sections 2949.15 and 2949.19, relating to state reimbursement of the county-paid
counsel fees, were not affected by the Act.
55. Interview with State Representative Harry J. Lehman, legislative sponsor of the Ohio
Public Defender Act, in Columbus, Ohio (Oct. 20, 1977).
56. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2941.51; 2949.15, .19 (Page 1975). For the extent to w'hich
the passage of the Ohio Public Defender Act affected these sections, see note 54 supra.
57. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) ("In criminal trials a State can no more
discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.").
58. The United States Congress also created a public defender program at the federal
level 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(h) (1970).
59. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.85.010-.180 (1974 & Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE AN. tit. 29,
§§ 4601-07 (1975 & Supp. 1977); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 802-1 to -12 (1976); MASs. AN'n. L.ws
cl. 221, § 34D (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974).
60. Eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-289 to -300 (West Supp. 1977); Ky. Ra,. STAT.
ANN. §§ 31.010-.240 (Baldwin 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 611.12-.35 (West 1964 & Supp. 1977).
61. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.50-.59 (West 1974 & Supp. 1977).
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Despite the existence of these numerous potential statutory mod-
els, the Ohio Act was drafted largely sui generis, 2  The result is a
hybrid system including a state public defender and local public de-
fenders, but still retaining a county-level option for a system utilizing
61court appointed private attorneys. Supervising the entire system for
providing legal services is the Ohio Public Defender Commission.
6 4
This general representation scheme uniquely and sensitively balances
state and local interests, allowing substantial local control but retaining
a strong state role in both representation and supervisory functions.
Under the Act, counties may elect to establish a county public
defender office 65 or to join with another county or counties in the es-
tablishment of a joint county public defender office, 66 Whether a pub-
lic defender office is established on a county or joint county basis does
not affect the types of representation to be provided, because county
public defenders are governed by representation provisions virtually
identical to those for joint county public defenders. 67  Counties are
also given the option of instituting an assigned counsel system utilizing
private attorneys.68  This option is particularly attractive to rural
counties lacking the need for a full-time public defender.69  Regard-
less of the manner used to provide local-level legal services, counties
receive fifty percent state reimbursement for the cost of the services
provided.70
In addition to this locally provided counsel, the Act creates the
Office of the State Public Defender that has a two-prong role of coordi-
nation and representation. The coordination function consists of over-
seeing the local representation systems.7 1 The representation function
consists of directly providing legal services in certain types of cases.72
The Act delineates the representation functions to be performed
at each level in the representation scheme.73 It contains provisions for
mandatory and permissive 74 representation by the state public de-
62. Interview with State Representative Harry J. Lehman, supra note 55.
63. Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 120.04, .15, .25, .33 (Page 1978).
64. Id. §§ 120.01-.03.
65. Id. §§ 120.13-.15.
66. Id. §§ 120.23-.25.
67. Id. §§ 120.16, .26.
68. Id. § 120.33.
69. According to the Act's legislative sponsor, the special needs of rural counties were
a major impetus for adding the assigned counsel option to the legislation, Interview with
State Representative Harry J. Lehman, supra note 55.
70. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 120.18, .28, .33(D) (Page 1978).
71. Id. § 120.04.
72. Id. § 120.06.
73. Id. §§ 120.06, .16-.17, .26-.27.
74. The terms "mandatory" and "permissive" will be used to describe statutory provisions
using the terms "shall" and "may" respectively. In fact, even the "mandatory" provisions are
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fender and by local public defenders, and states in what circumstances
a defender must be designated by a court (in effect, appointed)7s be-
fore proceeding in any particular instance. These mandatory and per-
missive provisions deal specifically both with the types of cases in
which representation is either required or authorized, and with the
stages of the various proceedings at which the representation must
or may attach. The Act is less specific in prescribing the types of
cases and stages of proceedings in which representation is to be pro-
vided under the county-level assigned private counsel option. Finally,
the Act contains language concerning indigency as a possible prereq-
uisite to representation and prescribes the manner in which indigency
is to be determined.
These representation provisions present serious problems of stat-
utory interpretation. Many provisions are susceptible to divergent
interpretations, or are apparently rendered meaningless by other parts
of the statute. In addition, the provisions must be evaluated in light of
the constitutional requirements for providing legal services. Constitu-
tional criticisms and evaluations appropriate for the state public de-
fender provisions are often equally appropriate for similar local public
76defender language.
A. Representation by the State Public Defender
1. Mandatory Representation
Section 120.06 is the principal provision authorizing representation
by the state public defender.77 Division (A) sets forth three prima
not mandatory in an absolute sense, because the Act allows a public defender to refuse to pro-
vide representation even in a "mandatory" case if he does not find "arguable merit" to the pro-
ceeding. Id. §§ 120.06(C), .16(D), .26(D). See text accompanying notes 81 and 102 infra.
75. A court's decision to designate a public defender as counsel is guided by constitutional
standards for providing counsel, as well as by the court's discretion to appoint either a public
defender or a private attorney. See text accompanying note 84 infra.
76. Compare OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 120.06(A) with § 120.16(A) and § 120.26(A) (Page
1978). The consequences of the constitutional issues, however, are usually more significant at
one level or the other, depending especially on whether the particular provisions are mandatory
or permissive. For example, while the state public defender has permissive representation au-
thority in "serious offense" prosecutions and in any proceeding that might result in a loss of
liberty, the local public defender provisions call for mandatory representation in the same cir-
cumstances. The Act's constitutional character concerning these types of cases can best be
judged by examining the more far-reaching provisions, i.e., the local public defender provisions
which are mandatory, not merely permissive.
77. O io REv. CODE ANN. § 120.06 (Page 1978) provides:
(A)(1) The state public defender, when designated by the court or requested by a
county or joint county public defender, may provide legal representation in all courts
throughout the state to indigent persons charged with the commission of a serious of-
fense as defined in the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(2) In all courts throughout the state the state public defender, %hen designated
by the court or requested by a county or joint county public defender, may representjuveniles, persons whose competency is being determined, or is to be determined, by
the probate court, and all other persons in any proceeding the outcome of xhich could
result in the loss of liberty.
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facie "mandatory" representation provisions and three permissive
ones. The state public defender "shall" represent prisoners asserting
unlawful imprisonment, persons committed or detained pending com-
mitment to a state mental institution, and-when designated by a
court or requested by a local public defender or by the Director of
the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction--parolees and proba-
tioners facing possible parole or probation revocation. 8 Standing
alone, these "mandatory" provisions seem clear, maintaining Ohio's
(3) The state public defender shall provide legal representation to persons com-
mitted to Lima state hospital or a state mental institution, or detained pending such
commitment, in any matter in which the person may assert that he is unlawfully com-
mitted or detained.
(4) The state public defender shall provide legal representation to any person in-
carcerated in any penal institution of the state, in any matter in which the person as-
serts he is unlawfully imprisoned or detained.
(5) The state public defender, in any case in which he has provided legal repre-
sentation or is requested to do so by a county or joint county ptblic defender, may pro-
vide legal representation on appeal.
(6) The state public defender shall, when designated by the court or requested
by a county or joint county public defender or the director of the department of reha-
bilitation and correction, provide legal representation in parole and probation revoca-
tion matters.
[(B) The state public defender may prosecute any appeal or other remedy before
or after conviction that he decides is in the interest of justice.]*
(C) The state public defender shall not be required to prosecute any appeal,
postconviction remedy, or other proceeding pursuant to divisions (A)(3), (A)(4), (A)
(5), and (A)(6) of this section, unless he is first satisfied that there is arguable merit
to the proceeding.
(D) A court may appoint counsel to assist the state public defender as co-counsel
when the interests of justice so require. When co-counsel is appointed to assist the
state public defender, such counsel shall receive such compensation as the court may
approve, not to exceed the amounts provided for in section 2941.51 of the Revised Code.
* Enclosed material disapproved October 14, 1975 by Governor James Rhodes.
A "sleeping giant" mandatory state public defender representation provision is found in statu-
tory provisions concerning the relationship between state and local public defender represen-
tation. See text accompanying notes 124-27 infra.
78. In the case of persons confined or threatened with confinement in a state mental in-
stitution, there is overlapping representation authority in another Ohio agency. Under OlllO
REv. CODE ANN. § 5123.94(A), (G) (Page Supp. 1977), the Ohio Legal Rights Service has very
broad power to initiate such "legal and equitable remedies as may be necessary to accomplish
the purposes of [chapters 5122 and 5123 (hospitalization of the mentally ill and mentally re-
tarded)] of the Revised Code" in its representation of persons "detained, hospitalized, dis-
charged, or institutionalized, and ...persons whose detention, hospitalization, discharge, or
institutionalization is sought or has been sought under [these chapters]."
Under these provisions, the Legal Rights Service has the authority to represent, among
others, persons who could also be represented pursuant to § 120.0(<A)(3), which provides that
the "state public defender shall provide legal representation to persons committed to Lima
state hospital or a state mental institution, or detained pending suc'i commitment, in any mat-
ter in which the person may assert that he is unlawfully committed or detained." Apparently,
persons falling within the terms of § 120.06(A)(3) can request repreentation by either the state
public defender or the Legal Rights Service. (Indigency, although not specifically mentioned,
may be required for § 120.06(A)(3) representation. See text accompanying notes 131-50
infra). Other persons involved in proceedings under chapters 5122 and 5123 are limited to
Legal Rights Service representation pursuant to § 5123.94.
This overlapping representation authority precludes either agency from fully developing
an expertise by handling all of the cases in this area when the tate is to provide counsel.
Although it might be possible for the two legal agencies to institute a cooperative arrangement,
see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 120.04(C)(3), 5123.94(G) (Page 1978 & Supp. 1977), the best solu-
tion to the overlap problem would be corrective legislation,
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codified right to counsel in postconviction proceedings' 9 and provid-
ing representation in response to decisions of the Supreme Court of
Ohio and the United States Supreme Court regarding mental commit-
ments and parole and probation revocation.8"
Division (C) of section 120.06, however, impugns the Act's con-
stitutional character, at least in the case of mental commitments and
parole and probation revocations, 81 by stating that even "mandatory"
representation by the state public defender does not require him to
participate in any proceeding "unless he is first satisfied that there is
arguable merit to the proceeding." The Supreme Court of Ohio did
not allow an "arguable merit" determination as a prerequisite to repre-
sentation in mental commitment cases,82 and the United States Su-
preme Court stated that the decision of whether counsel would be
necessary at parole or probation-revocation hearings was to be made
"by the state authority charged with responsibility for administering
the probation and parole system,, 83 not by the potential provider of
the legal services. The Act is probably not unconstitutional in these
representation provisions, because it expressly eschews limiting a
judge's power to appoint private counsel.84  Because a judge can ap-
point a private attorney when the Constitution requires representation,
the Act permits full compliance with constitutional mandates outside
the basic public defender structure. Nonetheless, to the extent that
a judge must resort to the appointment of private counsel, the Act
fails to supply a systematic and efficient method for providing con-
stitutionally mandated legal services.
2. Permissive Representation
Two of section 120.06(A)'s permissive provisions present an ob-
vious drafting oversight. Subdivisions (1) and (2) of division (A) set
forth occasions on which the state public defender may provide repre-
sentation if designated by a court or requested by a local public de-
fender. Subdivision (1) grants permission to represent "indigent per-
Because it is limited to persons detained or committed, and is further limited to state mental
institutions, § 120.06(AX3) leaves a gap in the public defender system's mandatory reprcsenta-
tion of persons threatened with mental commitments. This gap is filled by local public defender
representation. See text accompanying notes 112-16 infra.
79. See Onlo REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.24 (Page 1975), which was repealed with the enact-
ment of the Ohio Public Defender Act.
80. See notes 27 and 39 supra and accompanying text.
81. Representation in postconviction proceedings may not be constitutionally required at
alL See note 37 supra and accompanying text. Therefore, the Act's provisions pertaining to
postconviction proceedings may not be subject to constitutional criticism.
82. In re Fisher, 39 Ohio St. 2d 71, 313 N.E.2d 851 (1974).
83. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
84. OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 120.16(E), .26(E) (Page 1978). The private counsel's fees
and expenses would be paid by the county, which would receive fifty percent reimbursement
from the state. See id. § 2941.51 (Page Supp. 1977).
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sons charged with the commission of a serious offense."8 Subdivision
(2) authorizes representation of "juveniles, persons whose compe-
tency is being determined, or is to be determined, by the probate court,
and all other persons in any proceeding the outcome of which could
result in the loss of liberty." The difficulty stems from the broad "loss
of liberty" phrase in subdivision (2); this language appears to include
all cases covered by subdivision (1), thus rendering subdivision (1)
meaningless and unnecessary.86
The third permissive provision in section 120.06(A) is contained in
subdivision (5) and provides that the "state public defender, in any
case in which he has provided legal representation or is requested to
do so by a county or joint county public defender, may provide legal
representation on appeal." A related provision appears in section
120.03(C)(1)(c), which states that any person "entitled to legal repre-
sentation by the state public defender may elect representation on
appeal . . . by such office to supersede a county or joint county public
defender, court appointed local counsel, or other counsel then provid-
ing legal representation for such person."87  These two provisions
appear to represent opposite policy determinations. Section 120.06
(A)(5) suggests that the state public defender's appellate representa-
tion function is limited to cases in which he has provided representa-
tion in the court below, or in which he has been requested by a local
public defender to provide appellate services. On the other hand,
section 120.03(C)(1)(c) implies that representation by the state public
defender may be requested by a defendant to supersede local-level
defense, even if not requested by a local public defender. These
provisions can best be reconciled by reading each provision as a sepa-
rate and sufficient authorization for permissive appellate representa-
tion, although the legislative intent is unclear.
These permissive appellate representation provisions for the state
public defender are both broader and narrower than what United
85. A "serious offense" is defined in the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure as "any
felony, and any misdemeanor for which the penalty prescribed by law includes confinement
for more than six months." OHIO CRiM. R. 2 (Page 1975).
86. One way to read subdivision (I) to have independent meaning is to interpret the broad
phrase in subdivision (2) as referring back to earlier parts of (2), i.e., as being applicable only to
matters involving juveniles or competency determinations. This interpretation, however, runs
counter to the broad and explicit language in (2). Moreover, simPar language providing for
mandatory local public defender representation must be read independently (as opposed to
"referring back") in order to meet the requirements of Argersinge, v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972). See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 120.16(AX3), .26(AX3) (Page 1978). See text accompany-
ing notes 103-05 infra. In sum, the language of section 120.06(A)(2) cannot easily be read in a
manner that does not render (A)(1) superfluous.
Subdivision (2) also provides for permissive representation, upon court designation, be-
yond what the courts have required. Because there are parallel mandatory provisions for
local public defenders, the extension beyond constitutionally required representation will be
dealt with in connection with those provisions. See text accompanying notes 103-16 infra.
87. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 120.03(C)(1)(c) (Page 1978).
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States Supreme Court decisions have required.8 8 Although the Su-
preme Court has refused to recognize a general right to counsel in
discretionary appeals, 89 the Ohio Act clearly authorizes this represen-
tation. On the other hand, the Constitution does require counsel in
all appeals as of right.90 The state public defender's discretion in ap-
peals as of right is probably not unconstitutional, because representa-
tion by appointed private counsel is not precluded.91 Nonetheless,
because no mandatory appellate representation is provided either at the
state or local defender level,92 the Act does leave an area in which
appointed private counsel will be constitutionally required.93
Division (B) of section 120.06 also contains permissive represen-
tation authority: the "state public defender may prosecute any appeal
or other remedy before or after conviction that he decides is in the in-
terest of justice." This extremely broad authority, going far beyond
any constitutional mandate, could fairly be read to allow the state
public defender to institute any action on behalf of a client. This
might include, for example, a civil action against prison officials for
money damages or injunctive relief. This division, however, may be
without force because of an "item veto" by the Governor of Ohio.
Article II, section 16 of the Ohio Constitution allows item vetoes of
"'any item or items in any bill making an appropriation of money."94
The validity of the Governor's attempted veto of section 120.06(B)
is unclear for two reasons. First, it can be argued that the "contin-
gent appropriation' contained in section 4 of the Ohio Public De-
fender Act, i.e., an "appropriation" designated in the Act as one that
was contingent upon the availability of funds from specified sources,
was not an appropriation at all, and the legislation was therefore not
a "bill making an appropriation of money" within the meaning of ar-
ticle II, section 16 of the Ohio Constitution." Second, although an
Ohio Attorney General Opinion has expressed the contrary view," one
could argue that vetoes of nonappropriation items, even in a bill mak-
ing an appropriation, are not within the intended purpose of the con-
88. See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
89. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
-90. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
91. See Fredericks v. Reincke, 152 Conn. 501, 208 A.2d 756 (1965); McLaughlin v. State,
32 Wis. 2d 124, 145 N.W.2d 153 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 862 (1967). But see Davis v.
Wilson, 278 F. Supp. 852 (C.D. CaL 1968), af'd per curiam sub nom. Nelson v. Davis, 414 F.2d
1364 (9th Cir. 1969).
92. See text accompanying notes 119-20 infra.
93. See Fredericks v. Reincke, 152 Conn. 501, 208 A.2d 756 (1965); McLaughlin v. State,
32 Wis. 2d 124, 145 N.W.2d 153 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 862 (1967). But see Morris v.
State, 189 So. 2d 901 (Fla. App. 1966).
94. Onto CoNsT. art. II, § 16.
95. See Menz v. Coyle, 117 N.W.2d 290, 302 (N.D. 1962) (An "appropriation ... is
the setting apart of a definite sum for a specific object in such a way that the public officials can
use the amount appropriated, and no more than the amount appropriated.").
96. Op. Ono Arr'y GEN. 75-059 (1975).
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stitutional provision. The force of section 120.06(B)'s far-reaching
authorization thus remains in doubt.97
B. Representation by Local Public Defenders
Whether a locality is served by a county or joint county public
defender, the local public defender has the same basic representation
duties and authority, as a result of parallel sections created by the Ohio
Public Defender Act. Section 120.16 relates to county public de-
fenders, 98 and section 120.26 to joint county public defenders. 99 Thesections are identical in all pertinent respects.
97. In addition to the general representation provisions that hve been discussed, the state
public defender may take on matters left pending in counties that have terminated local public
defender programs. OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 120.13(E), .23(H) (Page 1978).
98. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 120.16 (Page 1978) provides:
(A)(1) The county public defender shall provide legal representation to indigent
persons charged with the violation of a state statute that is V serious offense as de-
fined in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and in postconviction proceedings as here-
inafter defined.
(2) The county public defender may provide legal representation to indigent per-
sons charged with the violation of an ordinance of a municipal corporation that is a
serious offense as defined in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, if the county public de-
fender commission has contracted with the municipal corporation to provide legal rep-
resentation for indigent persons charged with a violation of an ordinance of the munic-
ipal corporation.
(3) The county public defender shall represent, when designated by the court,
juveniles, other than juveniles charged with the violation of a municipal ordinance,
persons whose competency is being determined, or is to be determined, by the probate
court, and all other persons, except persons charged with the violation of a municipal
ordinance, in any proceeding with the outcome of which could result in the loss of
liberty.
(4) The county public defender may, when designated by the court, provide legal
representation to juveniles and other persons charged with the violation of an ordi-
nance of a municipal corporation, if the county public defender commission has con-
tracted with 'the municipal corporation to provide legal representation for indigent
persons charged with a violation of an ordinance of the municipal corporation.
(B) The county public defender shall provide the legal representation authorized
by division (A) of this section at every stage of the proceedings following arrest, de-
tention, service of summons, or indictment.
(C) The county public defender may request the state public defender to prose-
cute any appeal or other remedy before or after conviction that he decides is in the in-
terests of justice, and may provide legal representation in parole and probation revoca-
tion matters.
(D) The county public defender shall not be required to prosecute any appeal,
postconviction remedy, or other proceeding, unless he is first sat sfied there is arguable
merit to the proceeding.
(E) Nothing in this section shall prevent a court from appointing counsel other
than the county public defender. A court may also appoint coun!el to assist the county
public defender as co-counsel when the interests of justice so require.
(F) Information as to the right to legal representation by the county public de-
fender shall be afforded to an accused person immediately after being taken into cus-
tody, when brought before a magistrate, or when formally charged, whichever occurs
first.
99. Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 120.26 (Page 1978) provides:
(A)(1) The joint county public defender shall provide legal representation to in-
digent persons charged with the violation of a state statute that is a serious offense
as defined in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in postconvietion proceedings as
hereinafter defined.
(2) The joint county public defender may provide legal representation to indigent
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1. Mandatory Representation
Division (A) of each section sets forth two prima facie "manda-
tory" representation provisions. 00 The first provision, found in sub-
division (1), requires representation even without court designation, of
persons charged with a serious offense under state law. The second
mandatory provision, in subdivision (3), is limited to cases in which
the local public defender has been designated by a court. Under sub-
division (3), the public defender is required, except in municipal ordi-
nance matters, to represent juveniles, persons whose competency is
being tested in probate court, and "all other persons . . . in any pro-
ceeding the outcome of which could result in the loss of liberty."
These two "mandatory" provisions avoid the drafting problem
previously discussed in reference to the parallel permissive state pub-
lic defender provisions, under which the state public defender's broad
"loss of liberty" authority appears to render his "serious offense
authority superfluous.' 0' As to the local public defenders, however,
persons charged with the violation of an ordinance of a municipal corporation that is
a serious offense as defined in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, if the joint county
public defender commission has contracted with the municipal corporation to provide
legal representation for indigent persons charged with a violation of an ordinance of
the municipal corporation.
(3) The joint county public defender shall represent, when designated by the
court, juveniles, other than juveniles charged with the violation of a municipal ordi-
nance, persons whose competency is being determined, or is to be determined, by the
probate court, and all other persons, except persons charged with the violation of a
municipal ordinance, in any proceeding the outcome of which could result in the loss
of liberty.
(4) The joint county public defender may, when designated by the court, provide
legal representation to juveniles and other persons charged with the violation of an or-
dinance of a municipal corporation, if the joint county public defender commission has
contracted with the municipal corporation to provide legal representation for indigent
persons charged with a violation of an ordinance of the municipal corporation.
(B) The joint county public defender shall provide the legal representation auth-
orized by division (A) of this section at every stage of the proceedings following arrest,
detention, service of summons, or indictment.
(C) The joint county public defender may request the Ohio public defender to
prosecute any appeal or other remedy before or after conviction that he decides is in
the interests of justice and may provide legal representation in parole and probation
revocation matters.
(D) The joint county public defender shall not be required to prosecute any ap-
peal, postconviction remedy, or other proceeding, unless he is first satisfied that there is
arguable merit to the proceeding.
(E) Nothing herein shall prevent a court from appointing counsel other than
the joint county public defender. A court may also appoint counsel to assist the joint
county public defender as co-counsel when the interests of justice so require.
(F) Information as to the right to legal representation by the joint county public
defender shall be afforded to an accused person immediately after being taken into
custody, when brought before a magistrate, or when formally charged, whichever
comes first.
100. Division (C) of each section allows a local public defender to request that the state
public defender take over the prosecution of an appeal or other remedy before or after con-
viction. Presumably, state-level representation pursuant to such a request would satisfy the
local public defender's responsibilities under these and other mandatory provisions in § 120.16
and 120.26.
101. See text accompanying notes 85-86 supra.
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because of the requirement of court designation under subdivision (3)
but not under subdivision (1), subdivision (1) has independent impor-
tance; it allows the local public defender to act in serious offenses
(but not in all "loss of liberty" situations) without first being named
by a court.
On the other hand, because division (D) of sections 120.16 and
120.26 states that no appeal or other proceeding need be prosecuted
unless the public defender sees "arguable merit" to the proceeding,
the local public defender "mandatory" provisions are subject to the
constitutional criticism suggested for "mandatory" state public de-
fender representation. 102 That is, even though the Act is not unconsti-
tutional (because private counsel may be appointed), the Act's sys-
tematic effectiveness is weakened when constitutionally mandated
legal representation can be refused by a public defender.
Putting aside a possible refusal to represent a client pursuant to
division (D), the two mandatory local public defender provisions in
division (A) provide for representation that is consistent with a liberal
reading of Argersinger v. HamlinJ0 3 The mandate of Argersinger has
been variously interpreted to require representation (1) only if actual
imprisonment has resulted, (2) not only in cases of actual incarcera-
tion, but also in prosecutions for serious offenses with significant
penalties authorized by statute, or (3) in any case in which imprison-
ment, however short, is possible. While the first two interpretations
have found general acceptance, the third interpretation seems to be
held by an extreme minority.
0 4
Ohio's mandatory provisions for local public defender represen-
tation are apparently designed to comport with the second, "middle
ground" interpretation of Argersinger, which requires representation
not only in cases of actual incarceration but also in prosecutions for
serious offenses. Subdivision (A)(1) of sections 120.16 and 120.26
requires public defender representation (even without court designa-
tion) in the case of serious offenses. This subdivision must be read to
require representation irrespective of the actual penalty that results.
even if the judge has indicated before trial that no incarceration pen-
alty will be imposed. Under the "loss of liberty" language in subdi-
vision (A)(3), however, a court could decide not to designate a public
defender in a prosecution for a nonserious offense with an incarcera-
tion penalty authorized by statute, thereby forfeiting his right to im-
pose an incarceration penalty if a conviction resulted in the absence
of defense counsel. Of course, a court could choose to designate a
public defender under subdivision (A)(3) even if the judge had no in-
102. See text accompanying notes 81-84 and 88-93 supra.
103. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
104. See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
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tention of ordering incarceration, thus in effect, giving the defendant
the benefit of the third and most liberal interpretation of Argersinger.
Subdivision (A)(3)'s "loss of liberty" language also goes beyond
any reading of Argersinger by requiring representation, contingent
upon court designation, in any proceeding that could result in a loss of
liberty. The provision is not limited to criminal offenses, as was Ar-
gersinger, and could extend to any type of potential commitment or
incarceration.'0 5 Of course, the need for court designation provides a
limiting check on this otherwise broad provision.
As to matters involving juveniles, subdivision (A)(3) of sections
120.16 and 120.26 reflects the constitutional need for representation
under the Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault.'0 ' This subdivi-
sion provides for mandatory representation of juveniles by local public
defenders upon court designation.10 7  One could carefully examine
chapter 120 and conclude that no public defender representation of a
juvenile's parents is authorized, even when the result of a proceeding
might require the parents to involuntarily release the child into state
custody.108 However, the Ohio Public Defender Act also amended
portions of chapter 2151 (Juvenile Court) of the Ohio Revised
Code.'0 9 As amended by the enactment, sections 2151.28(C), 2151.314,
and 2151.3520 provide for the representation of parties, including
parents, pursuant to chapter 120. County and joint county public
defender-but not state public defender-representation is explicitly
mentioned. Although the language in sections 2151.28, 2151.314, and
2151.352 clearly authorizes, and apparently mandates, local public
defender involvement on behalf of parents,' sections 120.16 and
105. Cf. In re Calhoun, 47 Ohio St. 2d 15, 350 N.E.2d 665 (1976). In Calhoun, decided
after the enactment of the Ohio Public Defender Act, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that
legal representation is not constitutionally required in civil contempt proceedings.
106. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
107. This prerequisite of court designation does not affect the constitutional sufficiency of
the Act, so long as the court utilizes constitutional standards in determining whether to desig-
nate a public defender. See note 75 supra. The designation requirement does preclude public
defender involvement in the absence of court appointment. If, for example, the court wishes
to appoint private counsel, the public defender need not and cannot act on behalf of a juvenile,
even if the juvenile requests his services.
108. Ohio Revised Code § 2151.353, in conjunction with §§ 2151.03. 2151.031, and 2151.04.
provides for the disposition of a child adjudged to be "abused," "neglected." or "dependent."
Such disposition can include a commitment of the child into state custody. Oi11o REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 2151.353, .03, .031, .04 (Page 1976).
109. Id. §§ 2151.01-.99.
110. Id. 9§ 2151.28(C), .314, .352.
Ill. It could be argued that the language of §§ 2151.28(C). 2151.314, and 2151.352. as
amended, simply calls for representation within the literal confines of §§ 120.16 and 120.26.
Such an interpretation, however, would require a very restricted reading of the statutes. More-
over, fn such a weighty matter as the retention of the custody of one's own children, public policy
should favor a liberal interpretation, thus allowing public defender representation. Because
the language does not mention the state public defender, however, and because he has no
specific authority provided elsewhere, he apparently is not authorized to represent parents.
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120.26, the basic provisions for local public defender representation,
should be amended to reflect this representation function.
Subdivision (A)(3) of sections 120.16 and 120.26 also provides for
mandatory local public defender representation, upon court designa-
tion, of "persons whose competency is being determined, or is to be
determined, by the probate court." This provision authorizes the
representation mandated in mental commitment cases by the Supreme
Court of 'Ohio in Fisher.112  Because representation is authorized
before detention has begun and even though an adjudication of in-
competency could lead to commitment in an institution other than a
state mental institution," 3 the provision is broader than the state pub-
lic defender's mandatory representation function in mental commit-
ment cases. The state public defender's mandatory representation is
limited to persons committed or detained pending commitment to a
state mental institution." 4  Moreover, because local public defender
representation is not limited to commitment cases, it goes beyond what
the Ohio Supreme Court or other courts have held to be constitu-
tionally required," 5 authorizing representation, for example, when the
consequence of a determination of incompetency would be the ap-
pointment of a guardian."t 6  Here again, the requirement of court
designation tightens the broad sweep of the subdivision.
Another mandatory provision appears in subdivision (A)(1) of
sections 120.16 and 120.26, although its import is impossible to dis-
cern. The provision states that a local public defender is to provide
representation "in postconviction proceedings as hereinafter de-
fined." Unfortunately, the "hereinafter" definitions are nowhere
to be found in the Act.
Division (B) of sections 120.16 and 120.26 contains mandatory
language that is not found in the state public defender representa-
tion provisions.' '7  Division (B), which applies irrespective of whether
the local public defender representation is initially undertaken pur-
112. In re Fisher, 39 Ohio St. 2d 71, 313 N.E.2d 851 (1974).
113. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.15(C) (Page Supp. 1977).
114. Onio REV. CODE ANN. § 120.06(A)(3) (Page 1978). The function of the Ohio Legal
Rights Service, discussed in note 78 supra, overlaps with the function of local public defenders
as well as the state public defender. A cooperative arrangement might also be possible be-
tween a local public defender and the Ohio Legal Rights Service, see il. §§ 120.04(C)(3), .15(C),
.25(C); 5123.94(G) (Page Supp. 1977), but again, the best solution would be legislative.
115. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
116. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2111.02 (Page 1976).
117. The language is notably absent from the state public defender rovisions in § 120.06,
even though such language did apply to the state public defender in tle bill as introduced.
H.B. No. 164, 111th General Assembly (1975-76) (proposed § 120.07(B)). This omission has
little apparent significance, because nothing in the Act precludes representation at all stages
when the state public defender is authorized to provide representation in a certain type of case
and because court mandates must be complied with if the representation is to be constitutionally
adequate.
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suant to mandatory or discretionary language, states that a local
public defender "shall provide the legal representation authorized
by division (A) of this section at every stage of the proceedings fol-
lowing arrest, detention, service of summons, or indictment." This
language adequately provides for the pre-trial representation man-
dated by United States Supreme Court cases." 8 The division could
also be read to require local public defender representation after trial
on even discretionary appeals, going beyond constitutional require-
ments for representation after trial.1 9
Division (D), however, allowing a local public defender to decline
to prosecute appeals unless he believes they have arguable merit,
suggests that appellate representation by the local public defender,
like that by the state public defender, 20 is authorized but not abso-
lutely required, regardless of whether the appeal is as of right or dis-
cretionary.
2. Permissive Representation
Subdivisions (A)(2) and (A)(4) of sections 120.16 and 120.26
authorize permissive representation by local public defenders under
contract with a municipality in cases of alleged violations of municipal
ordinances. As with the mandatory provisions for violations of state
law, court designation is not required in the case of a serious offense
but is required in other cases. These permissive provisions evidence
a clear intent that municipalities themselves must provide for the rep-
resentation of persons charged with violations of their ordinances, al-
though they may-by contract-receive local public defender services
paralleling the services available in the case of state offenses. 12' Local
public defenders are also authorized, but not required, as is the state
public defender in certain cases,'2 to provide representation in parole
and probation-revocation matters. 23
118. See notes 29-34 supra and accompanying text.
119. See notes 35-39 supra and accompanying text.
120. See text accompanying notes 87-93 supra.
121. According to the legislative sponsor of the Ohio Public Defender Act, this legislative
policy resulted from the belief that, because Ohio municipalities benefit from fine money re-
ceived as a result of municipal ordinance convictions, the municipalities should bear the cost of
any required publicly provided legal defense services in cases of alleged violations of these
ordinances. Interview with State Representative Harry J. Lehman, supra note 55.
122. OHIo Rav. CODE ANN. § 120.06(A)(6) (Page 1978). See text accompanying notes
77-84 supra.
123. OHIo Ray. CODE ANN. §§ 120.16(C), .26(C) (Page 1978).
1977]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
C. Relationship Between State and Local
Public Defender Representation
Sections 120.17124 and 120.27..5 defy easy explanation. The sec-
tions state that in counties where a local public defender office has
been established, the state public defender "shall not be required to
defend indigent persons .. . , except as set forth in division (A) of sec-
tion 120.06 of the Revised Code or if the court finds that it is required
in the interests of justice."' 26  At first blush, the language seems
clear enough. As a general rule, state public defender representation
is not required (but would be permitted) in counties served by local
public defenders. The general rule is then subject to two exceptions:
(1) when section 120.06(A)'s mandatory representation provisions
apply; and (2) when a court finds that the interests of justice so require.
A close analysis of sections 120.17 and 120.27, however, reveals
that its apparent limit on mandatory state public defender activity in
counties with local public defenders amounts to no meaningful limit
at all, and in fact states an additional circumstance in which the state
public defender can be required to step in. The first "exception" to
the sections' "general rule" relates to mandatory representation pur-
suant to section 120.06(A), which in fact states all of the occasions on
which the state public defender can be required to provide represen-
tation. 27  In other words, this section 120.06(A) "exception" effec-
tively swallows up the "general rule." Thus, the other "exception,"
which provides for mandatory state public defender representation
when a court finds it to be required in the interests of justice, provides
a new and independent basis for requiring representation by the state
public defender, a basis with potentially broad significance.
D. Assigned Counsel Counties
Section 120.33 authorizes counties to establish by resolution a sys-
124. Id. § 120.17 provides:
In any county in which the county commissioners choose to establish a county de-
fender's office, the Ohio public defender shall not be required to defend indigent persons
in that county, except as set forth in division (A) of section 120,06 of the Revised Code,
or if the court finds that it is required in the interests of justice,
125. Id. § 120.27 provides:
In any counties in which the boards of county commissioners choose to establish ajoint county public defender's office, the Ohio public defender shall not be required to
defend indigent persons in those counties, except as set forth )n division (A) of sec-
tion 120.06 of the Revised Code, or if the court finds that it is r,:quired in the interests
of justice.
126. Id. §§ 120.17, .27. (emphasis added). One difficulty with tiese provisions arises in at-
tempting to reconcile them with § 120.03(C)(1)(c), which provides that a person entitled to
legal representation by the state public defender may elect such representation to supersede
that of a local public defender, thus suggesting a policy contrary to that expressed in §§ 120.17
and 120.27.
127. See text accompanying notes 77-84 supra.
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tem of assigned counsel representation using private attorneys instead
of local public defenders. The section in part provides: "The resolu-
tion shall include those provisions the county commissioners consider
necessary to provide effective representation of indigent persons in any
proceeding for which counsel is provided under this section."' 2
Beyond this vague language, the section fails to prescribe when rep-
resentation is to be provided in these counties. Presumably, the
statute authorizes county-paid legal services (and partial state reim-
bursement) whenever the Constitution requires publicly provided rep-
resentation.1 29  In addition, because the option of an assigned counsel
system serves as an alternative to local public defenders, it is arguable
that any provisions authorizing local public defender representation
beyond what is constitutionally required are implicitly contained in
section 120.33. Denying a person in an assigned counsel county
representation services available in a local public defender county
might well constitute an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of
the laws.1
30
IV. THE REQUIREMENT OF INDIGENCY
The representation questions discussed above have been consid-
ered initially without regard to the financial means of potential clients.
The Act's provisions relating to indigency are so poorly drafted that
they are susceptible to three different interpretations concerning
when indigency is required as a prerequisite to publicly provided
representation. To the extent that indigency is required, however,
the Act, supplemented by administrative rules adopted by the Ohio
Public Defender Commission, provides for an efficient method of de-
termining eligibility that allows consideration of all relevant financial
factors.
A. Is Indigency Required At All?
The Act's indigency provisions are susceptible to three interpre-
tations. They can be read to require indigency (1) only when the
128. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 120.33 (Page 1978).
129. See id. § 1.47(A).
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. In Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966), the United
States Supreme Court struck down a state statute imposing a duty upon certain unsuccessful
criminal appellants to repay the cost of transcripts used on appeal. The Court held that the
statute, which imposed the duty only upon persons who had been incarcerated after appeal.
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. ME. at 308. The Court rea-
soned that avenues of appeal, once established by a state, "must be kept free of unreasoned dis-
tinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts." Id. at 310. This reasoning
seems equally appropriate in the context of other important procedural devices established by a
state, such as the availability of publicly provided counsel Making this counsel available in
one county but not another in otherwise identical circumstances would seem to represent an
"unreasoned distinction" impeding "open and easy access to the courts," a distinction not
permitted by the fourteenth amendment.
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applicable representation provision explicitly mentions indigency, (2) in
all cases, or (3) unless the client is unable to obtain private counsel for
non-financial reasons. The first interpretation finds support in the
"clear on its face" rule of statutory construction; a statute with lan-
guage having a clear and obvious meaning will not be construed by
the courts to have another meaning."' The legislature clearly ex-
pressed its reason for creating the Ohio Public Defender Commission,
the commission that oversees all representation under the Act: "There
is hereby created the Ohio public defender commission to provide,
supervise, and coordinate legal representation at state expense for
indigent and other persons."'
32
In addition, some provisions in the Act specifically mention in-
digency as a requirement for representation while other provisions
do not.1 33  Section 120.06, the basic representation provision for the
state public defender, lists in division (A) six different occasions in
which representation by the state public defender is authorized." 4
Subdivision (1) states that representation may be provided to "in-
digent persons charged with the commission of a serious offense."'1
The remaining five subdivisions make no reference to indigency. The
clear implication from the presence of the modifying word "indigent"
in only one of the six representation provisions is that the other five
provisions do not require indigency. Sections 120.16 and 120.26, re-
lating to local public defender representation, make similar distinc-
tions, using the modifier "indigent" in subdivision; (A)(1) and (A)(2),
but not in (A)(3) or (A)(4).136  Section 120.33's express requirement
of indigency in order to receive representation in an assigned counsel
county lends further credence to the argument that indigency is not
required in the absence of such express language.
1 37
In the face of this literal interpretation, which calls for non-
indigent representation absent an express indigency requirement in the
particular provision, there stands another canon of statutory construc-
tion: A statute should not be construed to reach an unreasonable or
absurd result. t31 Results that are at least unreasonable, if not absurd,
131. Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 413 (1944).
132. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 120.01 (Page 1978) (emphasis added).
133. A settled rule of statutory interpretation is expressio rnius est exchslo alterlus.
(The expression of one is the exclusion of the other.) See Board of Educ, v. Boal, 104 Ohio St,
482, 485, 135 N.E. 540, 541 (1922).
134. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 120.06(A) (Page 1978).
135. Id. § 120.06(A)(1) (emphasis added).
136. Id. §§ 120.16, .26. Subdivision (A)(4) of these sections does, however, refer to indi-
gency in its description of the type of contract required for providing services in cases of
alleged violations of municipal ordinances.
137. Id. § 120.33. An equal protection problem is presented i, for example, representa-
tion is available to nonindigents in counties with local public defenders but not in those with as-
signed counsel systems. See note 130 supra and accompanying text.
138. Canton v. Imperial Bowling Lanes, Inc., 16 Ohio St. 2d 47, 242 N.E.2d 566 (1968);
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follow if the Act is read to require indigency only when the specific rep-
resentation provision expressly requires it. Under subdivision (A)(1)
of section 120.26, indigency is required in order for the state public
defender to have the authority to represent persons charged with ser-
ious offenses. Under subdivision (A)(2), however, indigency is not
required even though representation may be extended, under the
broad "loss of liberty" provision, to persons charged with nonserious
offenses having lesser potential penalties. The same type of anomaly
occurs under subdivisions (A)(1) and (A)(3) of sections 120.16 and
120.26, relating to local public defender representation. Thus, under
this interpretation of the Act, a millionaire charged with driving while
intoxicated139 could receive public defender representation under the
"loss of liberty" provision in section 120.06(A)(2), 120.16(A)(3), or
120.26(A)(3).
In addition to these problematic results under a provision by
provision determination of whether a requirement of indigency
exists, the overall thrust of the Ohio Public Defender Act suggests a
second interpretation of the statute: that indigency is required in all
cases. First, the Act is a response to constitutional dictates generally
applicable only to indigents.1 40  Second, provisions in the Act relating
to determinations of indigency suggest that it is uniformly required.
Section 120.03(B)(1) directs the Ohio Public Defender Commission to
establish standards "of indigency and minimum qualifications for
legal representation by a public defender or appointed counsel."'
41
Section 120.05, in conjunction with sections 120.15(D) and 120.25(D),
provides for determinations of indigency by the state or local public
defender.142  Division (B) of section 120.05 provides that the public
defender "shall investigate the financial status of each person to be
represented at the earliest time the circumstances permit." 43  Divi-
sion (C) provides that if a person provisionally receiving services
prior to a determination of eligibility is found to be ineligible for
services, the public defender "shall notify the person of the termi-
nation of his services." Division (D) states that a person able to af-
ford part of the cost of public defender services shall pay such portion,
but division (E) provides for full payment for services only if it is
found that a person was in fact "not entitled" to services previously
State ex rel. Cooper v. Savord, 153 Ohio St. 367, 92 N.E.2d 390 (1950). See also Oliuo REv.
CODE ANN. § 1.47(C) (Page 1978).
139. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4511.19, .99(A) (Page 1973 & Supp. 1977).
140. See notes 40-49 supra and accompanying text. The Ohio Supreme Court's decision
in Tymcio is an exceptional case. See text accompanying notes 50-53 supra.
141. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 120.03(B)(1) (Page 1978).
142. Id. §§ 120.05, .15(D), .25(D).
143. Id. § 120.05(B) (emphasis added).
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rendered,1 44 suggesting that a person fully able to afford private coun-
sel is never entitled to public defender representation.
A third solution to the problem of whether indigency is required
under the Act is the one most consonant with constitutional man-
dates and with basic notions of fairness and common sense. Under
this view, representation is provided in the same circumstances sug-
gested by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Tvmcio, 45 i.e., whenever
the person in need of legal services is unable to obtain private counsel
for whatever reason. Normally, the reason is a lack of financial means,
but the reason could be a notorious reputation, an unpopular political
ideology, or some other personal characteristic causing private attor-
neys to decline .to provide representation regardless of the client's
ability to pay. Unfortunately, this third approach to the requirement
of indigency does not find the statutory support available for either
the first or the second suggested approaches. Furthermore, because the
legislation was introduced several months before Tymcio was decided
and was not pertinently amended thereafter, Tymeio was evidently
not considered by the legislature.146  The best supporting language
available for this third approach is simply the general "representation
. ..for indigent and other persons" language used in describing the
purpose of the Ohio Public Defender Commission. 147
Despite the lack of supporting language and the presence of
language supporting other interpretations, it is this third approach
that the Ohio Public Defender Commission has adopted in its adminis-
trative rules. The rules state that a person is eligible for representa-
tion if he is "financially or otherwise unable to obtain an adequate
legal representation without substantial hardship to himself or his
family."'148 The rules go on to require a consideration of whether
competent, retained counsel would be available and willing to repre-
sent the person being considered for publicly provided representa-
tion. 49  These administrative determinations evidence an enlightened
and sound public policy approach to the problem of eligibility for rep-
resentation, even though the statutory support for these determina-
tions is meager at best. The legislature should expressly adopt the
144. These recoupment provisions in the statute are constitutionally permissible. Fuller
v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974). As to the validity of recoupment provisions generally, see An-
not., 32 L. Ed. 2d 936 (1973).
145. State v. Tymeio, 42 Ohio St. 2d 39, 325 N.E.2d 556 (1975), appeal dismnissed, 423
U.S. 993 (1975). See text accompanying notes 50-53 supra.
146. The Ohio Public Defender Act was introduced on January 24, 1975 as H.B. No. 164
of the lllth General Assembly. IIITH O1IO GENERAL ASSEMBLY H.J. 172 (1975). Tvnclo
was decided April 2, 1975.
147. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 120.01 (Page 1978).
148. OHIo ADm. CODE § 120-1-03 (Banks-Baldwin 1978) (emphasis added).
149. Id. § 120-1-03(F).
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Ohio Public Defender Commission's position by amending the stat-
ute.'
50
B. Determination of Indigency
For persons seeking representation on the basis of indigency, the
Ohio Act, as expanded by the administrative rules of the Ohio Public
Defender Commission, calls for a method of determining indigency
that is efficient and that allows consideration of all relevant financial
information.' The procedure for determining indigency is efficient
because, except in assigned counsel counties, 5 2 judges are not ordinar-
ily burdened by determinations of indigency, which are instead left to
the public defender requested to provide the services.13 The Act also
grants authority to the public defender to investigate the financial
status of the individual seeking legal services, including the power to
demand full financial disclosure by the individual and to obtain, with-
out charge, relevant public records of any state or local agency.
54
This type of expansive authority allows the public defender to obtain
sufficient information to make an informed decision on whether the
person requesting services is in fact indigent.
The Act authorizes the Ohio Public Defender Commission to es-
tablish standards defining indigency.'55 It goes on to suggest that a
liberal definition is appropriate: "[T]he commission shall consider an
indigent person to be an individual who at the time his need is deter-
mined is unable to provide for the payment of an attorney and all
other necessary expenses of representation. Release on bail shall not
prevent a person from being determined to be indigent."156  The
Ohio Public Defender Commission responded with a thoughtful stan-
dard of indigency, not requiring the absolute inability of an individual
to afford counsel, but rather an inability to do so "without substantial
hardship to himself or his family."157  Moreover, the inability re-
150. To the extent that any nonindigent person is found-under whatever interpretation of
the Act-to be eligible for legal representation, the language of § 120.05(D) and (E) could be
read as authority for requiring the person to pay for the legal services rendered. The Ohio
Public Defender Commission requires this payment under its administrative rules. Id. § 120-1-03
(1)(1).
151. For a discussion of the wide variety of procedures used for determining indigency
in a number of cities in the United States, see Wice & Suwak, Current Realities of Public De-
fender Programs: A National Survey and Analysts, 10 CRIM. L BuLl. 161, 168-70 (1974). See
also Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 1403, 1417-20 (1971).
152. O11o REv. CODE ANN. § 120.33(B) (Page 1978).
153. Id. §§ 120.05(A), .15(D), .25(D). The public defender's determination is subject to
court review. Id.
154. Id. §§ 120.05(B), .15(D), .25(D).
155. Id. § 120.03(B)(1). For a review of court cases dealing with definitions of indigency
under public defender statutes of the various states, see Annot., 36 A.LR.3d 1403, 1413-17 (1971).
156. OHIo Ry. CODE ANN. § 120.03(B)(1) (Page 1978).
157. Outo ADM. CODE § 120-1-03 (Banks-Baldwin 1978). Compare the very similar test
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ferred to in the Commission's standards is an inability to obtain
adequate legal representation and competent private counsel, 58 thus
avoiding a tortured determination that a person is not entitled to
publicly provided services because, for example, he could afford to hire
"a forty cent lawyer."1 59 The standards allow consideration of a vari-
ety of financial information, including the person's income, expenses,
assets, and liabilities.' Because his ability to borrow is also to be
considered,1 61 a person with little present income or wealth but with
significant future earning potential could properly be required to pro-
cure a loan on the basis of this potential and to retain private counsel.
The standards provide that no person shall be denied counsel "solely
because his friends or relatives, other than spouse, have resources
adequate to retain counsel unless such friends or relatives volunteer
to obtain counsel promptly."'' 62 This approach, taking account of the
financial resources of the person and his spouse, but generally not
of others, is a compromise that has been adopted in a number of
states. 163  The standards emphasize that indigency requirements shall
not be so stringently construed that they might influence a person to
waive representation rather than incur the expense that might en-
sue. 16 4  The standards also indicate that a person able to pay for a
portion of the cost of legal services may still obtain publicly provided
representation, but will have to pay for the portion that he can af-
ford. 6
5
V. CONCLUSION
The representation provisions of the Ohio Public Defender Act
evidence a unique blend of the very best and the very worst in legisla-
tive efforts. On the positive side, the Act creates a basic structure
of state and local-level representation and control that is a sensitive
approach to the proper role for each governmental level. In addition,
the Act generally comports with constitutional requirements for pub-
licly provided representation and in some instances goes beyond con-
suggested by Duke, supra note 8, at 628, and the test proposed by Justice Goldberg, See text
accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
158. OHIO ADm. CODE §§ 120-1-03, 120-1-03(F) (Banks-Baldwin 1978).
159. For a pitiful instance in which a defendant was denied counsel and found guilty alter
such a comment by the judge, see S. BING & S. ROSENFELD, TIE QUALITY OF JUSTICE IN T 111
LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS OF METROPOLITAN BOSTON 51 (1970).
160. OHIO ADm. CODE § 120-1-03(A) (Banks-Baldwin 1978).
161. Id.
162. Id. § 120-1-03(B).
163. Some states do not consider the spouse's resources, Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 1108,
1114-16 (1973).
164. Omo AD, . CODE § 120-1-03(G)(1) (Banks-Baldwin 1978).
165. Id. § 120-1-03(l).
[Vol. 38:855
PUBLIC DEFENDER ACT
stitutional mandates to supply counsel when significant interests are
at stake. Furthermore, as a result of statutory and administrative
guidelines, determinations of indigency are based on realistic apprais-
als of ability to retain adequate private counsel.
The Act's deficiencies, however, outweigh its favorable attributes.
It leaves gaps in a public representation system that should provide
all counsel required by the Constitution. Its internal inconsistencies
and ambiguities make it impossible for attorneys, let alone potential
clients, to know the scope of representation responsibilities at any
particular level in the system. Finally, the Act's contradictory pro-
visions on whether indigency is required as a prerequisite to represen-
tation are inexcusable.
These problems deserve the immediate attention of the Ohio Leg-
islature. The legislature should extend representation to all cases in
which it is constitutionally required, without pulling back from legisla-
tive extensions beyond those requirements. Incomprehensible provi-
sions should be made comprehensible. The Ohio Public Defender
Commission's approach to the requirement of indigency should be ex-
pressly endorsed by statute. Until these problems are resolved, the
Ohio Public Defender Act will remain but a partial and halting re-
sponse to the need for an efficient and practical system for providing
necessary legal services.
Daniel 0. Conkle
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